Social identity has become accepted as a key concept underpinning the endogeneity of economic behaviour and preferences. It is important in explaining attitudes towards redistribution and pro-social behaviour. We examine how economic theory measures social identity and its eects on preferences towards redistribution, social solidarity and redistributive institutions. Empirical evidence indicates that social identity carries weight in explaining the presence of social preferences and attitudes towards redistributive institutions.
Introduction
The standard consumer-sovereignty principle assumes that people make decisions based upon their own utilities that in turn represent their independent, exogenous preferences. But it has long been recognised in economics that this may be an oversimplication: the social and cultural environment with which the agent interacts aects the agent's behaviour by inuencing preferences and attitudes (Veblen 1899) . Of course standard decision-making models can be adapted to incorporate departures from such a framework, resulting from limited information, agency relationships and network externalities involving other people's actions. However, economists have only recently examined the phenomenon of preference interdependence in greater depth and so it is useful to revisit a such central issue in the economics discipline. One specic route to incorporate preference interdependence is to explicitly model identity and its eects on behaviour.
Social identity has been dened in social psychology as that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (Tajfel 1978) . So identity relies on a shared psychological or physical category. But how does identity inuence traditional decisionmaking models? We argue that the extent to which identity inuences preferences has wide-ranging implications for welfare economics and calls into question the independence of welfare analysis built upon exogenous individual preferences (Zizzo 2003) . More specically, the eects of social identity may provide some clues as to why population diversity reduces altruism and redistribution: for example Luttmer (2001) nds a suggestive negative relationship between diversity and preferences for redistribution.
This paper provides an overview of the literature of identity and its eect on redistribution attitudes. We examine whether an individual's attitudes towards the other members of society, the institutions that guarantee redistribution and the underlying preferences towards a world of more redistribution are driven by social identity. In doing so we address the following questions:
What do economists understand by social identity and how does it dier from other similar concepts such as social motivation, group externalities and more general concepts of network eects and culture?
How does the economics literature conceptualise preferences and attitudes towards fairness, particularly about redistributive institutions and policies?
Is there evidence of a potential relationship between social identity, preferences for redistribution and attitudes toward the welfare state?
Empirical evidence is available from both econometric and experimental studies; the latter has the obvious advantage that it controls for unobserved effects and can be monitored more easily (internal validity), at the cost of losing some external validity. We attempt to classify the existing approaches and evidence to provide a summary picture of the state of the art and to suggest some ways forward.
The organisation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the idea of identity in economics and its possible relationship with social preferences.
Section 3 discusses the evidence on the determinants and preferences for redistribution and outlines how social identity may help in explaining some stylised facts; it examines the meanings of social identity in economic theory.
Section 4 assesses the available evidence on the eects of social identity on redistribution and pro-social attitudes, drawing upon dierent relevant social dimensions. Section 5 provides a discussion of the existing ndings along with an evaluation of the ways forward and oers some conclusions.
Redistributional Preferences and Identity
Redistribution is one of the central features of welfare states. Clearly, the maintenance of redistributive institutions largely depends on individual support for taxing higher incomes more heavily and targeting expenditures to social need. Our focus here is on individuals' willingness to redistribute. Dierent forms of redistribution and altruism are constrained by individual attitudes through some form of aggregation rule; changes in the willingness of people to pay taxes, to transfer resources to the neediest and support for redistribution-enhancing institutions may induce signicant changes in redistribution. The extent of subjective willingness to accept redistributive transfers and its relation to actual redistribution is something that calls for empirical investigation: it is important to establish a framework that appropriately represents what appears to go on in the real world and to identify the key variables in the supposed relationship. If subjective preferences for redistribution determine tolerance of redistribution in practice, then the underlying mechanisms of such attitudes should be examined and integrated into economic models.
One potential constraint lies in the group formation of preferences. By this we mean the assumption that people's preferences for redistribution are interdependent in the sense that they are inuenced by the characteristics of other people around them (Luttmer 2001) . People appear to be more likely to redistribute to the groups they identify with, be that identication based on ethnicity, religious group, social class, nation state or region. The importance of shared identities lies is this: when people fail to match with one identity category they may not put weight on redistribution towards members of that category, or they may develop oppositional identities which can explain segregation and isolation (Battu and Zenou 2010) .
Not only attitudes matter in explaining behaviour. Economic behaviour is the result of the interaction between people's attitudes and their social environment, the latter being a principal source of interdependence. The extent to which individuals internalise their social environment by adopting the values of a social group is reected in dierences in social identity. In that way social identity can potentially determine the extent of individual altruism towards the members of a group vis-a-vis those outside the group. As a consequence, changes in the denition and categorisation of what the group values and whom it includes may have a non-negligible inuence on an individual's altruistic behaviour or attitudes toward redistribution. Groups develop common shared meanings ( cultures as dened by Guiso et al. 2006) , constrained by prior common values and social norms; some of their members' behaviour is path dependent, rather than being chosen by individuals themselves at every point in time.
The inclusion of social identity in decision-making models, however it is conceived, challenges the assumption of preference independence by drawing upon some form of collective denition of the self. It calls for a reconsideration of the formation of both individual and social-welfare functions. Social identity is environmentally learned and instrumentally determined by objectively identiable psychosocial traits (such as language, social class and gender). Similarly, it is constructed and reinforced through several forms of social interaction spreading information on social norms and values. The group shapes individuals' preferences by dening a sense of belonging , namely, a collective denition of the self that parallels and to some extent complements that of the individual. To explain these externalities further, Akerlof (1997) presents two behavioural models: people either try to increase their social distance (when they are status seeking) or they align themselves more closely (by adopting a conformist behaviour) with certain social categories.
In the later case, an individual suers disutility from deviating from his or her category norms, which causes behaviour to conform toward those norms even when it encompasses sacrices to their own well-being (Costa-i-Font and Jofre-Bonet 2012).
The seminal paper by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) conceptualises these ideas formally by considering a set of social categories and associated prescriptions, so that identity gives rise to a utility gain from conforming individual's actions to the prescriptions of each social category. Identity is envisaged as a sense of self or self-image nested in social categories: a person's social environment encompasses a set of prescriptive norms, so that people are willing to sacrice material pay-os to meet such social norms. Luttmer (2001) provides empirical evidence showing that individual preferences for redistribution depend on the characteristics of people around them.
He shows evidence of a negative exposure eect whereby people decrease their support for welfare programmes as the welfare recipiency in their community rises. Similarly, they show evidence of a racial group eect suggesting that people increase their support for welfare spending as the share of the recipients from their own racial group increase. Bisin et al. (2008) and Battu et al. (2007) construct a model of ethnic identity formation focusing on how choice of identity is aected by cultural transmission. In their model, social interactions that lead to identity formation are conceptualised as a network externality that can explain several economic phenomena, for instance why employment rates of white population are associated with that of nonwhites. Using experimental data Klor and Shayo (2010) nd that people's preferences over redistribution are aected by the payos of other in-group members. Shayo (2009) generalises Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , and Klor and Shayo (2010) consider identity as resulting from perceived group status, namely the relative position of a group in a hierarchy of categories (such as occupation or education) and its distance from, or similarity with, that of other members of the group. Group identication comes from two processes: the rst process is where people care about the status of the group (relative status) and the second process is dened by an individual's conscious willingness to resemble other group members (distance or proximity). The former could be categorised as a specic form of esteem-dependent behaviour.
Broadly speaking, one may claim that social identity gives rise to individual actions to protect the social self which include reciprocity and welfare-maximising actions, which in turn give rise to social preferences. Examples of the inuence of identity include religious identity eects on the contribution to public goods and worker reciprocity .
The latter can be tested experimentally by means of environmental cues (also called primes ) that can temporarily make a certain social category more salient to certain groups, causing a person's behaviour to tilt more toward the norms associated with the salient category. Social identity, as we will discuss later, can be shown to inuence, for example, tipping behaviour, blood and organ donation or even participation in electoral processes (the vote turn-out puzzle), despite the tangible net individual benet of such behaviour being regarded as being almost negligible. Using status as a market-clearing variable Shayo (2009) suggests two possible equilibria to explain the vote turn our puzzle. In the rst one, the members of the lower class (who constitute a majority) identify with their class: as a consequence they vote for a relatively high level of redistribution; this can in turn help strengthen class identity by endowing it with a higher status. In the second type of equilibrium, members of the lower income (working) class tend to think of themselves more as members of the nation as a whole than as members of a low-status part of it.
Findings suggest that a common national thread and extensive heterogeneity among the working class weakens working-class solidarity.
Besides redistribution itself, social identity may exert an inuence on redistributive institutions. The latter refers primarily to the welfare state, support for welfare services and social insurance schemes. Welfare states undertake both redistribution (anonymous redistribution) and insurance (collective risk sharing): both may be sensitive to the weakening of social identity. Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that support for the welfare state will be weakened as a result of increasing social heterogeneity. They demonstrate that there is a negative correlation between racial fractionalization and the level of social spending. This view has been challenged by the fact that reliance of immigrants are perceived as groups that overwhelmingly receive welfare benets (Boeri et al. 2002) even when empirical evidence of such belief is very weak. However, recently Dahlberg et al. (2012) nds some evidence of increased immigration eects on the support for redistribution using exogenous variation from policy migration reform in Sweden. Now let us turn to the way identity has been given meaning within the context of economic analysis. Belonging to a group provides people with self esteem and social norms;
conforming with the group norms nurtures a distinction from the rest of society (Abrams and Hogg 1990) . However, the social categories into which people place themselves exist only in relation to other contrasting categories.
Hence, the value of each group identity derives from a comparison of those within the group with with the traits of those in some other reference group.
Identity-driven behaviour is such that those traits that favour the in-group are usually emphasised and within-group distinction will be minimised (Stets and Burke 2000) ; group and individual outcomes are perceived as interdependent. People tend to associate themselves with highly successful groups, although membership as in the case of ethnic or gender group is not always chosen. Furthermore, not all members are equal: whilst weak members of a group gain through the mere group identication, relatively strong members of the group strive to improve status by group identication (Ellemers et al. 1990 ).
It is possible to conclude that the process of identication with a group is endogenously determined, or even socially constructed to some degree. The latter explains that group formation is inherently variable, uid, and context dependent. McAdams (1995) even argues that groups use intra-group status rewards as a non-material means of gaining material sacrice from members.
People value the opinions of the groups to which they belong and seek to be acknowledged as members in good standing. However, in the case of interaction with other groups, McAdams (1995) argues that discrimination is a means by which social groups produce status for their members.
Alternative approaches outside economics suggest that identity refers to the subjective expression of one's commitment to, sense of belonging to, or self-identication with the culture, values and beliefs of a specic ethnic group and social life (Masuda et al. 1970 , Makabe 1979 , Unger et al. 2002 .
The early work by Tajfel and Turner (1979) nds that people exhibit an intra-group preference either when the group is central to their self-denition (and a given comparison is meaningful) or, when it is instrumentally useful.
Most frequently employed uses of identity include cultural features such as language, religion, media and food preferences, holiday celebrations and associated behaviour (Phinney 1990 , 1992 , Unger et al. 2002 . Bellini et al. by Becker (1991) and Becker and Murphy (1993) . Applications include gender behaviour (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) , education (Akerlof and Kranton 2002) and contract theory (Akerlof and Kranton 2005) . In Akerlof and Kranton (2005) they focus on intra-group eects on cooperative behaviour. So, if an agent internalises an organisation's objective and norms, it may suce as a form of motivation to sustain high eort. Insiders will exert more eort than outsiders because they gain identity payos and accordingly corporate eorts to build organisational identity may produce returns. Hence, redistributive preferences to a group may result from identity providing some form of non-monetary or social reward.
Identity can also result from ideas and beliefs. Bénabou and Tirole (2007) develop a complementary framework based on the individual management of beliefs and identity investment In such a setting, for instance, parents may purposely transmit distorted views about the reality of inequality and social mobility to their children in order to inuence their incentives (Bénabou and Tirole 2006) . Wichardt (2008) argues that identity is multidimensional. It may be that tradeos arise in people's categorisations of identity, so that the various weights for dierent categories may not be perfectly aligned and can even become mutually contradictory. Identity may be the result of a choice of the social categories that provide higher perceived status. The idea that there are identity gains through group membership assumes that all group members are equal and that each attributes group success to himself. Increased in-group homogeneity and a small group size facilitate the individual's identication (or social aliation) with the respective group. In essence each individual will focus especially on those groups which oer the most favourable comparisons in the given context and for which the individual's social aliation is high.
Identity as beliefs
By contrast Bénabou and Tirole (2007) explicitly specify a broad class of individual beliefs inuencing their self-identity, that people value and invest in, which in turn produce both tangible and intangible returns. Following this line of argument, a preference for redistribution would be motivated by giving satisfaction to an idea of oneself as a generous person insofar as it would produce an intangible or cognitive gain. They also study the eect of endogenously arising self-serving beliefs linked to pride, dignity or wishful thinking as nurturing social identication, all of which can both aect prosocial behaviour and social preferences.
Identity as culture
The main drawback of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) lies in that it oers no account of how identities are formed. Partly to account for this Fang and Loury (2005) adopt a cultural approach to identity based on dening identity as the result of social interaction rather than an expression of people's beliefs or choices. In other words, social identity is the outcome of many individuals making a common choice. As in Bénabou and Tirole (2007) identity is all about self-perception. However, they dene choices about identity as those made by rational agents anticipating subsequent interaction and its payos.
It is argued that individuals adopt a similar identity because it helps them manage collective action problems. Dierent social contexts would give rise to dierent identity equilibria. The application of this approach helps to explain racial and social inequalities and more generally how social (dis)integration results from cultural dierences between disadvantaged groups that exacerbate pre-existing inequalities.
Pure and instrumental identity
Identity may interact with factors such as self-interest so that it is possible to distinguish given (pure) identity from instrumental (impure) identity. The latter is the result of a self-interested choice motivated by the attainment of higher status. The higher a group in the status hierarchy, the more this group can contribute to the positive payos from its members. Accordingly, it is possible to distinguish this from Akerlof and Kranton (2000): pure membership eects form other instrumental reasons for using social identity to ascend socially, obtain additional income and generally self interest. Pure identity eects refer to the desire and utility gain that results from acting in compliance with one's own (inherited or not chosen) identity, which refers to internalised social rules and personality.
Instrumental identity relies on the assumption that individuals invest in dierent identity aliations (Becker and Mulligan 1997 , Fang and Loury 2005 , Bénabou and Tirole 2007 . Identity can turn out to be a strategic action to maximize utility and payos, rather than an inherited trait.
Other related concepts
It is argued that social capital is determined by culture and institutions.
For instance, institutions in place such as the welfare state may inuence preferences for redistribution, but enduring social values and cultural beliefs underpin such institutions too. Social identity is embodied in individuals so that social capital can be seen as an expression of social norms and culturally induced preferences rather than a conscious choice.
Closely related to identity is the concept of proximity. Indeed, proximity reects some idea of social distance, which reects for instance the extent Identity may be simply be an expression of social distance: those with whom people identify are simply those to whom people feel closest and whose needs are perceived to be closest to their own. Going beyond simple categorisations, the strength of identity is possibly a factor that matters but that has until now received limited attention. One explanation for this is that strength of identity is a dicult construct to measure in natural groups. Inevitably when identity is induced in an experiment it is hard to know the extent to which group identity is based on the right social categorisation.
Modelling identity
Canonical model (Akerlof and Kranton 2000) Although, as we have discussed in the previous section, one could dene identity in dierent ways, the economics literature focuses mainly on one convenient model of identity that has been extensively developed. In this model, identity is based on categories, prescriptions and actions. Each person in society belongs to one or more social categories and the prescriptions indicate social norms associated with each social category or an ideal for each category. A person j's utility depends on actions and identity as follows:
where I j is the identity of person j, a j denotes the actions of j and a j are the actions of others. In turn identity can be modelled as:
where P refers to prescriptions and c j refers to social categories.
As an extension of the Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 
where the weight of a zero-strength category is nil and the disutility of deviating from one's norm decreases with s. The individual chooses x to maximise utility for a given value of s; so the rst-order condition gives the optimal decision as:
a weighted average of the preferred action with and without identity. The priming eect can be dened as follows:
which indicates that evoking a person's identity s in an experiment will trigger preference assimilation only for those highly identied with that identity, namely those whose actions are not too distant from those prescribed by a specic social category.
Oppositional identities (Bisin et al. 2011 ) Battu et al. (2007) and Battu and Zenou (2010) contribute to the conceptualisation of identity by dening an individual's utility function as a set of actions based on binary events (for example, wear the veil, G, or do not wear the veil, B) and the intensity of its identity, so that individuals maximise the following welfare expression:
where the term λ(α)QI refers to the social utility loss for the individual of interacting with people of dierent groups, I i and Q i are, respectively, the psychological cost and the probability of an interaction, and C(α) is the direct cost of an interaction. In addition, the model contains an explanation for the persistence of identity based on the interaction of parental and peer inuence.
Identity as Status Shayo (2009)(Klor and Shayo 2010)
Another extension of Akerlof and Kranton (2000) is Shayo (2009) and Klor and Shayo (2010) where identity is conceptualised as status (S j ) as follows:
identication with a group means caring about the status of the group. So, consider a a number of groups labelled 1, 2, ..., J and let us suppose that every individual i in some group j uses another group r(j) as a point of reference. Actions a of the individuals and their payos are represented by the status of a group dened as a function of the group's payos as follows:
and the utility function is given by
where u and v are both strictly increasing functions and u is weakly concave. An alternative approach : endogenising identity Bénabou and Tirole (2007) endogenise both the identity payos as well as the categorical prescriptions in Akerlof-Kranton alongside people's cognitive costs of their actions. They do so by taking an investment perspective whereby individuals have a stock of identity capital A t+1 that is the result of some form of investment a t with a return r t as follows:
An individual's utility function depends on his knowledge about himself v i which may not be known with certainty, his stock of identity A t that can be experienced ex-ante and his investment decisions to maximise U (v i , A t , a t ). 
Measuring identity
Identity can be measured using survey questions. The latter include measures of dierent types of identity, including territory ( more European than 
Reinterpreting the Empirical Evidence
The economics literature has long been interested in exploring evidence on inequality and redistribution. Preferences for redistribution depend on current and future economic position. However, the classic Meltzer and Richard model argued that redistribution depends on the mean to median ratio of income distribution (as proxying the median voter support for redistribution)
has not been empirically validated.
The empirical evidence on the determinants of redistributional preferences has grown rapidly since Meltzer and Richard (1981) , but generally it has not been able to show a clear empirical regularity that ts the prescriptions of classical approaches. We may identify three approaches. The rst of these relies on the premise that it is mainly economic self-interest that shapes pro-redistribution preferences. This premise also underlies the eco- In addition to the dierent approaches in the literature, one can identify specic variables that correlate with redistribution preferences. Specifically, income proxies self-interest which may aect support for redistribution. Other variables such as marital status, employment status, education and age, race have a very strong eect: blacks are much more favourable to redistribution than whites (Alesina and Giuliano 2010) . However, it is unclear how the evidence on these factors matches the theory.
In the classic (Meltzer and Richard 1981) 
Group Identity as Work Incentive
Evidence from the literature in psychology (Pettigrew 1998 ) and economics (Goette et al. 2006) suggests that there is a general tendency towards ingroup preference because people are more inclined to concede rights and entitlements to persons who are perceived as the same (rather than to those regarded as dierent). Gang et al. (2002) nd evidence of group eects on a prisoner's dilemma experiment using data from natural groups in the Swiss Army. However, when experimental data is examined results are more mixed. Eckel and Grossman (2005) show that group identity is insucient to enhance public-good cooperation, though actions enhancing group behaviour do have a positive eect on cooperation. In contrast, Charness et al. (2007) nd that, using standard social identity measures, no signicant eects are found in a battle of sexes game whilst McLeish and Oxoby (2007) nd that negative out-group opinion enforces cooperation. Finally Chen and Li (2009) nd evidence that group identity has signicant eects on distribution preferences. Hargreaves Heap and Zizzo (2009) distinguish the eect of identity resulting from simple belonging to a group from other idiosyncratic inuences such as social norms and other group characteristics and undertake a valuation of group membership using incentive compatible willingness to pay and to accept. The importance of the latter lies in the fact that, in small and articial groups experiments, social identity eects can be manipulated (Chen and Li 2009) . Findings suggest that group identity enhances rewards and reduces punishments, establishes distributional preferences and social welfare-maximising actions. Consistent with this Klor and Shayo (2010) nd that over a third of the population deviates from self interest in supporting group tax rates.
In regards to modelling identity and work incentives, Akerlof and Kranton (2005) envisage corporate culture as triggering the division of workers into dierent groups, the prescribed behaviour for each group and the extent to which workers identify with the organization or with the work group and, as a result in adopting their respective organisational goals. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) show that preferences and attitudes towards the welfare state dierent between eastern and western Germany as reecting endurance and communist values. However, using contingent valuation techniques for the world cup as a case study, Süssmuth et al. (2009) nd that such eects are less lasting. Burlando and Hey (1997) In dealing with national identity, it becomes essential to distinguish both cultural and legal dimensions. Whilst the latter is reected in dierences in attachments and norms, the former relies on a related concept that in some dimensions coincides with that of identity.
National and Class Identity Clubs
Class identication is found to predict voting behaviour (Evans 2000) .
Empirical evidence from Shayo (2009 Shayo ( , 2010 suggests that indeed status does exert an inuence in explaining identity-related behaviour. Poorer people are more likely to be nationalistic (Shayo 2009 ), which is explained by a greater similarity to the national prototype.
Furthermore, the formation of a group requires the existence of an outer group in such a way that the absence an outer group can be argued to inhibit cooperation when committing to global agreements is costly (Wichardt 2008 ). Casey and Dustmann (2010) examine ethnic identity in Germany and nd that children of immigrants identify more strongly with their home country than with the host country. Both mothers and fathers have a very weak sense of German identity and identify quite strongly with their native country. As expected, they also nd that the time spent in Germany increases the probability of reporting a German identity. In contrast, Nekby and Rödin (2010) analyse the question of ethnic identity in Sweden. Their results indicate that the feeling of togetherness with the Swedish majority culture is not systematically connected to the probability of feeling a strong connection with the minority culture.
Gender and Language Clubs
Language and gender form naturally occurring groups that merit special study. Cadsby and Maynes (1998) examine whether gender identity inuence voluntary contributions to public goods and nd that gender does not exert signicant eects. However, in a threshold public-goods experiment Croson et al. (2003) nd that gender identity is signicant in a naturally occurring group. Solow and Kirkwood (2002) nd evidence of gender group behaviour on public-good contributions. nd that in two laboratory experiments making gender identity more salient induces some conformity with gender induced norms.
Consistently with the idea that communication between members of a group leads to lower transaction costs, a common language is expected to help to enhance a sense of belonging as has been shown in the case of Catalonia and the Basque Country (Aspachs-Bracons et al. 2008) . Language can be an important marker of social identity by aecting people's interdependence and people may seek social mobility by using the language of a more highly evaluated group, such as the Catalan case. Language is explored as a determinant of cultural identity and as explaining economic exchange in Germany (Falk et al. 2010) . The importance of language is picked up in the association between, ethnolinguistic diversity and redistribution, or the provision of public goods (Desmet et al. 2009 ).
Ethnicity and Migration
The Battu et al. (2007) model where non-whites identify with their social environment, their culture of origin and where social networks can nd them jobs reveals that people, who are otherwise identical, end up with totally dierent choices. Depending on how strong peer pressures are, non-whites choose to adopt`oppositional' identities because some people may identify with the dominant culture and others may reject it, even if it implies adverse labour market outcomes. In a further empirical study Battu and Zenou (2010) investigate the relationship between ethnic identity and employment.
They nd that in the UK people's identity choice is greatly inuenced by their social environment, that there is considerable heterogeneity in the non-white population in terms of preferences and that those non-whites who develop and manifest oppositional and extreme identities are penalized in the labour market, experiencing a 6% to 7% lower probability of being in employment. Bisin et al. (2006) nd that, in line with their theoretical analysis, identity with and socialisation of an ethnic minority are more pronounced in mixed than in segregated neighbourhoods. The strength of identication with the majority culture regardless of the strength of (ethnic) minority identity is important for labour market outcomes (Nekby and Rödin 2010) .
Migration changes the social composition of the welfare state clientele;
under the conditions of greater social heterogeneity it becomes more dicult to gain the endorsement of the welfare state. Bay and Pedersen (2006) demonstrate how support for specic social welfare benets greatly depends on the composition of the group receiving welfare. Greif (1994) shows that ethnic networks adopting a common set of institutional rules reduce the cost of coordination and enforcement. Darity et al. (2006) use an evolutionary game to explain the formation of racial identity being the result of both intra-and inter-group interactions. Keely and Tan (2008) nd that general views on redistribution are heterogeneous according to race as well as income determinants including socioeconomic background, age, and gender. Specic views on welfare are heterogeneous primarily according to race.
Similarly, studies examining racial identity argue that people tend to adopt the identity of the dominant group. Bodenhorn and Ruebeck (2003) nd that mixed-race people beneted when they could form a distinct racial class falling between between dominant white and subordinate black. Earlier contributions include Stewart (1997) , that provided an initial attempt to formalize an economic analysis of identity. He argues that the intensity of racialcultural identity is a commodity that should be included in the individual's utility function. Individual racialcultural identity is an argument in the individual utility that is aected by the prevailing norms of own-and other-group racialcultural identity. Consistently, the intertemporal change in the stock of own-group racialcultural identity is a complex composite of individuals' identities. Bernhard et al. (2006) 
4.5
Religion Clubs Alesina and Giuliano (2009) nd that certain religious aliations are associated with a higher preference for redistribution. , reports experimental evidence building on a model inspired by Akerlof and Kranton (2000) , examine how the saliency of religious identity inuences people's choices. They nd that the saliency of religious identity stimulates individual contributions to public goods. However, they do not nd supportive evidence that religious identity aect work eort and generosity in a dictator game. Furthermore, Guiso et al. (2003) nd that religion matters as a driver of economic attitudes. Bisin et al. (2004) show that religious socialization across US states is more intense when a religion is in a minority. 
Discussion
Incorporating social identity into economic analysis can provide useful alternative explanations to overcome the empirical limitations of the traditional Meltzer and Richard (1981) approach to explain why societies redistribute.
Identity may inuence how people behave specically their pro-social behaviour as well as more general attitudes towards redistribution. However, the empirical identication of identity on redistributive preference is far from straightforward. Identity can exert second-order eects on redistributive institutions, that in turn have an eect on individual preferences for redistribution. For instance, the welfare state, as a (potentially) redistributive institution, was assembled from pre-existing social bonds. At the same time it can be argued that, as an institution, welfare programmes may have contributed to strengthening such bonds between its members, so that the relationship between identity and redistribution is likely to be recursive. Dierent cultures may emphasize in dierent ways the relative merits of equality versus individualism, an issue discussed in detail by Alesina and Glaeser (2004) ; therefore some form of circularity exists between individual and societal attitudes to inequality and preferences for redistribution.
Methodologies to identify and measure identity are varied and still being developed; they can be divided into those derived from experimental evidence and those derived from survey evidence. Two studies have explored the association of social identity and pro-social behaviour using controlled experiments that hold strong internal validity. Chen and Li (2009) One important question in modelling identity lies in separating those components of identity that are endogenous because they result from people's choices (instrumental identity) and those that are given. People are not entirely free to choose their own identity given that it may be imposed on them in the light of others' behaviour and perceptions. Some consensus in the identity literature indicates that interactions within social groups make interaction with non-members less desirable: stronger identication within a group will increase cooperation with this group relative to others. However, evidence from articial and natural groups exhibits dierent results.
A question that remains to be researched further concerns the mechanisms through which identity operates. Preference interdependence may result from the presence of forms of social identication within some reference groups, in the form of so called reference dependent preferences (Loomes et al. 2003) . Another possible behavioural explanation lies in the existence of a conrmatory bias, which implies that once an individual forms a strong hypothesis about something they tend to be inattentive to new information (Rabin 1998) . Some other explanations can be found in the neuro-economics literature where neuro-transmitters and levels of serotonin are found to correlate with preference interdependence (Zizzo 2002) .
It can be argued that, although social identity has been a category falling outside the realm of economics (mainly studied within the social psychology and sociology literatures), identity cannot be ignored if economic phenomena such as redistributive preferences are to be adequately understood and empirically modelled. Among the most important questions that need further examination we should highlight the need of connecting further social identity with other related approaches such as club goods. Whilst the mainstream literature associates identity as following from categories underpinning status, there is a parallel literature that links identity with self-esteem and beliefs in which people invest. Finally, it is important to point out that at the moment most studies employ a partial measure of social identity based on some categorisation (e.g., nation, gender, language etc), but we know little about which categories matter the most, and how people trade them o.
As far as policy is concerned, the recognition of the importance of social identity within economics suggests the need to go beyond simplistic notions of equality and opens the door to the understanding of policy solutions to stigma, exclusion, xenophobia and racism among other social behaviour.
More generally, it points to the role of identity as a key social choice.
